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Why do some international crises escalate into violence while others do not? I argue that an understanding of crisis behavior necessitates awareness of the processes preceding a crisis and propose two mechanisms that link precrisis hostility with crisis violence. The population fatigue mechanism suggests that precrisis hostility interrupts the everyday life of a population, strengthening its demand for a harsher response. If leaders behave with restraint during a crisis and after the crisis hostilities resume, leaders risk facing greater dissatisfaction from their now even more fatigued population. The baseline for resolve mechanism suggests that if states are actively hostile before a crisis, they must maintain hostility during a crisis to credibly demonstrate resolve. Findings on international crises between 1918 and 2010 support the interphase relationship: a crisis escalation is significantly more likely after a hostile precrisis period. The behavior of opponents can indicate how crises might unfold even before they begin.

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Why do some international crises escalate into violence while others do not? I argue that an understanding of crisis behavior necessitates awareness of the processes preceding a crisis and propose two mechanisms that link precrisis hostility with crisis violence. The population fatigue mechanism suggests that precrisis hostility interrupts the everyday life of a population, strengthening its demand for a harsher response. If leaders behave with restraint during a crisis and after the crisis hostilities resume, leaders risk facing greater dissatisfaction from their now even more fatigued population. The baseline for resolve mechanism suggests that if states are actively hostile before a crisis, they must maintain hostility during a crisis to credibly demonstrate resolve. Findings on international crises between 1918 and 2010 support the interphase relationship: a crisis escalation is significantly more likely after a hostile precrisis period. The behavior of opponents can indicate how crises might unfold even before they begin.

Cover -- Half-Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Editors' Note and Acknowledgement -- List of Contributors -- List of Abbreviations -- Part I From Pupils to Partners -- 1 Days of Seclusion -- 2 Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1800-1900 -- 3 The Royal Navy and Japan, 1900-1920: Strategic Re-Evaluation of the IJN -- 4 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the First World War -- 5 Britain, Japan and the 'Higher Realms of Intelligence', 1900-1918 -- Part II From Allies to Antagonists -- 6 Double-Edged Estimates: Japan in the Eyes of the British Army and the Royal Air Force, 1900-1939 -- 7 The Royal Navy and Japan, 1921-1941 -- 8 Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921-1936 -- 9 The Path Towards an 'Anti-British' Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars -- 10 Britain, Japan and the 'Higher Realms of Intelligence', 1918-1945 -- Part III From Foes to Friends -- 11 The Imperial Army Turns South: the IJA's Preparation for War against Britain, 1940-1941 -- 12 'Ground of Our Own Choosing': the Anglo-Japanese War in Asia, 1941-1945 -- 13 The Anglo-Japanese War and Japan's Plan to 'Liberate' Asia, 1941-1945 -- 14 British Assessments of Japanese Naval Tactics and Strategy, 1941-1945 -- 15 British Policymakers and the Prisoner-of-War Issue: Perceptions and Responses -- 16 Changes in Perception: British Civil and Military Perspectives on War Crimes Trials and Their Legal Context, 1942-1956 -- 17 The Japanese Military's Attitude Towards International Law and the Treatment of Prisoners of War -- 18 The British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan and its Association with the Japanese -- 19 The Anglo-Japanese Relationship after the Second World War -- Index.